Nash equilibrium

Results: 1082



#Item
511Nash equilibrium / Science / Correlated equilibrium / Strategic dominance / Strategy / Best response / Mechanism design / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

I Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups 1

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2014-10-17 05:00:51
512Subgame perfect equilibrium / Solution concept / Bargaining problem / Mechanism design / Ordinal number / Game theory / Problem solving / Nash equilibrium

Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game1 David K. Levine2 March 18, 1995 © This document is copyrighted by the author. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is dist

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:20:24
513Solution concept / Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Rationalizability / Normal-form game / Strategic dominance / Strategy / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Information set / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Self-confirming equilibrium

Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium1 First version: April 25, 1995 This revision: July 12, 1999 Eddie Dekel

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 1999-07-12 13:09:31
514Decision theory / Quantal response equilibrium / Bargaining / Nash equilibrium / David K. Levine / Drew Fudenberg / Self-confirming equilibrium / Solution concept / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Game theory / Economics / Problem solving

Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? The ordinary versus the extraordinary1 Max Weber Lecture June 8, 2009 David K. Levine2

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2009-06-24 13:21:07
515Nash equilibrium / Repeated game / Extensive-form game / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Minimax / Subgame / Strategy / Game theory / Problem solving / Mathematics

Title: The Castle on the Hill Author: David K. Levine Department of Economics UCLA Los Angeles, CA[removed]phone/fax[removed]

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2000-01-04 12:26:06
516Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Best response / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Strategy / Bayesian game / Risk dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Extensive-form game

When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27
517Self-confirming equilibrium / Nash equilibrium / Bayesian game / Extensive-form game / Strategy / Solution concept / Strategic dominance / Best response / The Intuitive Criterion / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002 Abstract

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 12:28:39
518Nash equilibrium / Subgame / Strategy / Information set / Bayesian game / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Solution concept

Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2005-07-18 17:35:40
519Game theory / Politics / Voter turnout / Mathematical economics / Microeconomics / Sociology / Comparative statics / Nash equilibrium / Tactical voting / Voting theory / Elections / Economics

THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY DAVID K. LEVINE, UCLA THOMAS R. PALFREY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY A BSTRACT. It is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical obs

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2005-09-13 19:12:22
520Science / Drew Fudenberg / Self-confirming equilibrium / David K. Levine / Fictitious play / Nash equilibrium / Solution concept / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Best response / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

An Economist’s Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 5, 2006 In their wide-ranging and provocative discussion, Shoham, Powers and Grenager (SPG) survey several large literatu

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2006-10-05 10:44:53
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